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THE 2015 PETER MAIR MEMORIAL LECTURE
Peter Mair on representative democracy1,*
Rudy B. Andeweg
Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
As parties fail, I argue, so too fails popular democracy. (Mair, 2006b, p. 10)
It is more than 25 years since Dick Katz and Peter Mair presented the first
version of their joint paper on the emergence of the cartel party at the ECPR
Joint Sessions of Workshops in Limerick, in Peter Mair’s native Ireland. Pub-
lished in the maiden issue of the journal Party Politics in 1995, this is now
one of the most cited papers in political science (3,986 citations according
to Google Scholar in November 2018!). That paper is not only an important
milestone in Mair’s work on party organizations, but it also marks the start
of a development in his thinking that links party organization to the function-
ing of representative democracy more generally. He wrote about representa-
tive democracy as a linkage mechanism between the policy preferences of
citizens and the policy-making of their elected representatives in an increas-
ingly pessimistic voice. That growing pessimism, and Mair’s reasoning behind
it, are still relevant today. Although Mair’s views evolved gradually, we can
discern roughly three phases in this development: the first phase includes
the work with Katz on the cartel party and related papers, the second
phase contains a series of papers around 2004–2007, and the third phase
covers the last years before his untimely death.2
Phase I: democracy transformed
In their work on the emergence of the cartel party, Katz and Mair identified
three changes: the roots of political parties in civil society are withering,
parties are increasingly dependent on the state for resources, and parties con-
verge in terms of their policy positions. Together, these three developments
mark the emergence of the cartel party. By now a considerable body of
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literature has developed discussing the cartel party thesis, but less attention
has been devoted to the fact that Katz and Mair explicitly associated the
cartel party model with a revision of the model of representative democracy.
In that revised model,
Democracy ceases to be seen as a process by which limitations or controls are
imposed on the state by civil society. Political leadership needs to be renewed
and elections provide a peaceful ritual by which this may be accomplished.
Feedback is necessary if rulers are to provide government that is broadly accep-
table, and contested elections, which signal public pleasure (or displeasure) with
policy and outcomes, provide that feedback. Thus, the state provides contested
elections. And since democratically contested elections, at least as currently
understood, require political parties, the state also provides (…) political
parties. (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 22)
Thus, in this view of democracy, the people still constitute the principal and
parties are the agents, but the principal-agent relationship is no longer based
on ex-ante controls or a ‘party mandate’, but on ‘ex-post controls’ or ‘account-
ability’. This view of democracy is not so different from contemporaneous ana-
lyses by other colleagues (e.g. Manin, 1997), and it marks a transformation of
democracy, not necessarily a deterioration. However, the fact that Katz and
Mair also described elections in Bagehotian terms as a ‘dignified’ (read: sym-
bolic) rather than an ‘efficient’ part of the constitution (1995, p. 22) signals that
for them more is at stake than a mere transformation. This is even more clear
in ‘Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege’ (Mair, 1995). In
that paper he uses De Tocqueville’s analysis of the French nobility gaining pri-
vileges while losing their social purpose to warn that a similar asymmetry lies
at the heart of popular disenchantment with political parties: more visible as
public-office holders, but less relevant as representative agencies. Surely, the
situation is more menacing than a transformation when representative
democracy is compared to the Ancien Régime!
Phase II: democracy hollowed out
This becomes more clear in the second phase in Mair’s thinking on represen-
tative democracy, with a series of overlapping papers: ‘Democracy Beyond
Parties’ (Mair, 2005), ‘Ruling the Void?’ (Mair, 2006a) and two lectures, the
Uhlenbeck Lecture at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (Mair,
2006b), and the Schapiro Memorial lecture (Mair, 2007).
In the first phase, democracy was changing, not declining because political
parties were adapting, not weakening. But in this second phase, Mair explicitly
corrected his earlier ‘optimism’ about party change: ‘This now seems far too
sanguine an interpretation’ (Mair, 2006a, p. 50): Political parties are failing
rather than adapting, and ‘As parties fail, I argue, so too fails popular democ-
racy’ (Mair, 2006b, p. 10). In this phase he developed a distinction between
146 R. B. ANDEWEG
popular democracy (which is about representing the people) and consti-
tutional democracy which is not clearly defined, but seems to be a combi-
nation of checks and balances and government not by, but for the people
(Mair, 2006b, p. 9). Mair argued that political parties used to link popular
and constitutional democracy. By abandoning their representative role
parties no longer do that. As a result, public debate on democracy has
become ‘an attempt to redefine democracy in the absence of the demos’
(Mair, 2006b, p. 9).
‘Democracy without a demos’ is a phrase that will remind many of debates
on the democratic deficit in the European Union. Indeed, it is particularly in
this phase that Mair started to look at the relationship between European inte-
gration and the evolution of democracy, which later was developed further in
work with among others Jacques Thomassen (e.g. Mair & Thomassen, 2010).
The problem of EU democracy is not a separate theme in Mair’s view: the
failure of political parties to link popular democracy and constitutional democ-
racy underlies both the widespread disenchantment with the EU and the
malaise of national democracy: in his view euroscepticism is merely part of
a wider ‘polity scepticsm’ (Mair, 2006b). Both at the national and at the EU
level, the withdrawal of parties from popular democracy means that their
role in constitutional democracy lacks legitimacy. Therefore ‘It probably
cannot succeed in the long term’ (Mair, 2006b, p. 31), and we are witnessing
‘the hollowing of Western Democracy’ (Mair, 2006a).
Phase IIIA democracy Redeemed…
In the third phase, in Mair’s last writings on representative democracy, two
new arguments emerge. In one of them, he drew attention to a tendency
towards bipolarism in many party systems. He does so most clearly in ‘The
Challenge to Party Government’ (Mair, 2008) and in ‘Is Governing Becoming
More Contentious?’ (Mair, 2011a). In more and more countries, political
parties seem to cluster together into two blocs. Using measures developed
with Bartolini for interbloc volatility (Bartolini & Mair, 1990), Mair showed
how the divide between the governing bloc and the opposition bloc is
becoming more important for voter movements, at least in absolute
terms. Bipolarism used to be exceptional, but it is now the rule in Europe.
Only five countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, Swit-
zerland are exceptional in not following this bipolarizing trend (Mair
2011a, 79).
In itself, this is good news. If parties are no longer sociologically or ideologi-
cally distinct from each other, voters can no longer vote prospectively on the
basis of the parties’ programmes and the only option left is to vote retrospec-
tively on the basis of the parties’ past performances. But for such accountabil-
ity to work, voters must be able to throw the rascals out which is only possible
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in a two-party system, or at least in a bipolar party system. As Mair
acknowledges,
This [bipolarization] is all well and good. The argument might also stop here –
leaving us with a new rough and ready equilibrium that is more in tune with
the new roles of parties and the new patterns of competition. As a result
there would be no need to talk of a democratic malaise or of a crisis of legiti-
macy. In this new order, politics and party competition would be different,
but not necessarily less effective or less legitimate. (2009, p. 9)
But then Mair goes on to reject bipolarization as a solution for the hollow-
ing of representative democracy. The reason for that rejection is simple: Mair
has never come round to the idea that accountability can completely replace
mandate:
To be sure, there is a choice between the competing teams of leaders and, given
the growing evidence of bipolarity, that particular choice is becoming more
sharply defined. But there is less and less choice in policy terms, suggesting
that political competition is drifting towards an opposition of form rather than
of content. (2008, p. 227)
Phase IIIB… or democracy beyond repair
This, I think, is debatable, but Mair offered a stronger reason to be concerned
about the future of representative democracy. In a 2009 paper for the Max
Planck Gesellschaft he replaced his distinction between popular and consti-
tutional democracy with a clearer and more powerful distinction between
representative and responsible government. Representative government is
government that is responsive to public opinion. Responsible government
is government that is prudent and consistent, that meets the country’s inter-
national obligations etc. The two are increasingly incompatible: the individua-
lization of civil society makes it more and more difficult for parties to read
public opinion. And even if they can read public opinion, more and more
external constraints and the weight of the legacies of past policy making
force parties to ignore public opinion. Note that the cartel party is now
absent from this latest analysis. It only plays a role in the sense that cartel
parties are unable to appeal to party loyalty to persuade voters to accept
that the party could not keep its promises because it was forced to act
responsibly.
In ‘Bini Smaghi and the Parties’, Mair (2011b) used the fallout of the
financial crisis in Ireland to illustrate the widening gap between being respon-
sive and acting responsibly. The Italian economist Lorenzo Bini Smaghi was
the member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank who
forced the Irish political parties to put their financial obligations above elec-
toral considerations. Other examples are not difficult to find: Iceland reluc-
tantly meeting its financial obligations to the UK and the Netherlands
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caused by the Icesave bank’s collapse in 2008 despite two refusals by Iceland’s
president Grimsson to sign the relevant bills, and despite two rejections by
Iceland’s citizens of the compensations in referendums; Greek Prime Minister
Tsipras calling a referendum to reject the EU bail-out programme in 2015, only
to accept an even harsher austerity programme barely a week later. Such inci-
dents can now be seen retrospectively as further illustrations of Mair’s diagno-
sis of a growing incompatibility of responsiveness and responsibility.
This is just a brief and sketchy account of the three phases in Mair’s think-
ing about representative democracy. There are other interesting differences
between the phases, such as his treatment of populism. In the first phase,
the rise of the populist right was regarded as the natural sequel to the
cartel party, in a kind of dialectic development (Katz & Mair, 1995, pp. 23–
24). In the second phase populism is not only a characteristic of new parties
on the right, but of all parties, including the established parties (most
notably Blair’s New Labour) (Mair, 2002). In the third phase, Mair sees a bifur-
cation of the party system, with the established parties acting responsibly, but
not responsively, and the populist parties acting responsively, but not respon-
sibly (Mair, 2009, pp. 16–17).
But the most important aspect of the three phase development is that with
each phase Mair grew more pessimistic about the future of representative
democracy. If in the first phase he saw representative democracy as being
transformed, in the second phase he saw it being hollowed out. In the third
phase, this hollowing out was confirmed, but it was now seen as a process
from which there is no turning back: ‘(…) we have a situation in which the
malaise is pathological rather than conditional’ (Mair, 2009, p. 17).
Pessimism challenged
At first sight, the gradual evolution of Mair’s thinking about representative
democracy until his final diagnosis that individualization and globalization
pull the established political parties into opposite directions is convincing.
As always in Mair’s work, his arguments are persuasive, and his presentation
is seductive. But for the sake of argument, and more than that, let me also
mention two points of criticism: about the interpretation of the evidence,
and about the underlying assumptions.
I do not dispute Peter’s evidence of party change and of changes in civil
society, but I do not always agree with his interpretations of that evidence.
Is, for example, declining turnout evidence of parties’ weakened roots in
civil society, of ‘citizens (…) heading for the exits of the national political
arena’ as Mair argues (2006a, 44)? In most countries, the long-term decline
in turnout is hardly dramatic (Franklin, 2004). Moreover, measured across
several consecutive elections, the group of hardcore non-voters is not very
big (e.g. Sigelman et al. 1984; Marsh, 1991). Voters have a great variety of
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motives for voting or non-voting. What we see emerging is that more voters
make a deliberate decision to participate or to abstain on the basis of what is
at stake and of what is on offer. The distinction between ‘first order’ and
‘second order elections’, originally developed for elections to the EU Parlia-
ment (Reiff & Schmitt, 1980), is a powerful one, and not all elections are
‘second-order’ – not all elections are merely ‘dignified’ parts of the
constitution.
It is even less clear why increasing volatility and ticket splitting point to dis-
engagement of citizens: ‘Inconsistency goes hand in hand with indifference’,
says Mair (2006a, 38). But does changing one’s party preference really fore-
bode a withdrawal from political engagement, or is volatility a sign of
voters who, finally liberated from their subcultural shackles, begin to make
their own choice on the basis of programmes or performance rather than
identity (e.g. Rose & McAllister, 1986)? That would be a strengthening rather
than a weakening of democracy, would it not?
And while it is true that parties have moved closer to each other ideologi-
cally, is it not an exaggeration to say that ‘As party programmes become more
similar (…) there is a shrinkage in the degree to which electoral outcomes can
determine government actions’ (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 22), or that ‘the rep-
resentation of the citizens, to the extent that it occurs at all, is given over to
other, nongoverning organizations and practices (…) that are disconnected
from the party system’ (Mair, 2009, p. 6). Perhaps with the help of increasingly
popular voter aid applications, voters are still able to distinguish between
parties and the differences between parties are still translated into govern-
ment policy (Dalton, Farrell, & McAllister, 2011).
Leaving such contested interpretations aside, Mair’s pessimism seems
based on his insistence that political representation should focus on pro-
grammes rather than performance and on two related assumptions, one
explicit, the other implicit. The explicit assumption is that the only viable
form of democracy is one in which political parties take centre stage. The
famous Schattschneider quote, that ‘political parties created democracy and
that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties’ (1942, p. 1)
surfaces in many of Mair’s publications:
Without parties, and still following Schattschneider, we would then be left with
no real democracy and no real system of representative government; or with
what continues to be called democracy, but which would be redefined so as
to downgrade or even exclude the popular component – since it is this
popular component that depends so closely on party. (2006b, p. 12)
Dalton et al. argue that Mair is overinterpreting Schattschneider, that he is
even putting Schattschneider on his head ( 2011, p. 13). That may be an over-
statement on their part, but it should be reiterated that the notion that parties
cannot be missed is not more than an assumption, Schattschneider quote or
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not; it is not a tested hypothesis. At the time of the introduction of universal
suffrage, the resulting increase in scale caused widespread pessimism about
the viability of representative democracy. Unforeseen by many, a new form
of elite-mass linkage – political parties, provided a solution for that increase
in scale. The current weakening of political parties gives rise to a revival of
that pessimism, as if other forms of elite-mass linkage are not only unforeseen
at this moment, but also unthinkable.
Not only did Mair explicitly espouse a very party-centred view of democ-
racy, but implicitly he also has a very European-centred view of political
parties. It is a common complaint among European political scientists that
many of our concepts and theoretical notions, about party identification, pol-
itical representation, executive-legislative relations, etc. were developed in
and for a very exceptional political system: that of the US. But with political
parties it seems to be the other way around. Duverger, Rokkan, and Sartori
conceptualized political parties in and for Europe. However, European political
parties may well be exceptional, with their origins in social cleavages, their
emphasis on ideology rather than patronage as a mobilizing device, the dom-
inance of the ‘mass party type’ as the organizational principle, etc. These are
very different animals compared to the parties of the Americas, of Asia, and of
Africa (Blondel & Inoguchi, 2012, pp. 1–11).
In the cartel party paper, Katz and Mair still criticize those who see only a
weakening of parties on the grounds that they look at the developments with
Duverger’s mass party as their point of reference:
Many recent discussions of the decline of party are predicated on the assump-
tion that the Duverger/socialist mass-party model is the only model for parties.
We contend that this assumption is misconceived, that the mass-party model is
only one, temporally limited and contingent model, and that it is necessary to
differentiate notions of adaptation and change from notions of decline or
failure. (1995, p. 5)
But in his later work, this is exactly what Mair does himself: the erosion of the
sociological and ideological distinctiveness of parties is argued to result in a
failure of parties to represent, and this in turn hollows out democracy. This
implies that the mass party indeed sets the standard for Mair. Moreover,
Mair paints a rosy picture of the era of the mass party. For him, it was a
kind of Golden age of representative democracy. This is evident in passages
such as the following: ‘Previously, and probably through to at least the
1970s, conventional politics was seen to belong to the citizen, and something
in which the citizen could, and often did, participate’ (2006a, 44), Others
would perhaps see that era as characterized by elite directed participation,
by top-down mobilization, not by truly participatory democracy.
Mair’s work on the evolution of representative democracy sets a standard.
Terms such as ‘the cartel party’ and ‘representative v. responsible government’
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will be part of the standard vocabulary of comparative politics for years to
come. His eventual pessimism about the future of representative democracy
is also shared by many. It is because of my disagreement with some of Mair’s
interpretations of the evidence and with his dismissal of political represen-
tation based on accountability, and because I feel that his assumptions
about the indispensability of political parties of the ‘mass-party’ type have
biased his conclusions that, while I share many of Mair’s concerns about the
evolution of representative democracy, I do not share his pessimism. From
a scholarly, but especially from a societal perspective, it is important that
we continue this debate, even if we have to do so without the scholar who
has contributed so much to it.
Notes
1. An earlier version has been published in Dutch in Res Publica vol. 54, 2012.
2. Identifying the relevant publications to trace Mair’s views is not as straightfor-
ward as this sentence makes it appear. First, there is the complication of coau-
thors, in this period most notably the longtime partnership with Katz. If I
attribute ideas to Mair that were actually initiated by his coauthor, I can only
apologize. Second, there is the complication of posthumous publications com-
pleted by others (e.g. Mair, 2013), or coauthored with others (e.g. Katz & Mair,
2018). These I largely ignored.
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